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Abstract
According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), gains and losses are mea-
sured from current wealth, which serves as a reference point. We attempted to ascertain
to what extent the reference point shifts following gains or losses. In questionnaire stud-
ies we asked subjects what stock price today will generate the same utility as a previous
change in a stock price. From participants’ responses we calculated the magnitude of ref-
erence point adaptation, which was significantly greater following a gain than following
a loss of equivalent size. We also found the asymmetric adaptation of gains and losses
persisted when a stock was included within a portfolio rather than being considered indi-
vidually. In studies using financial incentives within the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak
(1964) procedure, we again noted faster adaptation of the reference point to gains than
losses. We related our findings to several aspects of asset pricing and investor behavior.
Keywords: Prospect theory; Reference point; Asset pricing; Security trading
1 Introduction
The reference point plays a prominent role in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky
1979). In this theory outcomes are measured against current wealth, which serves as
a reference for the evaluation of utility or “value.” An important question is how this
reference point is updated through time as a function of the outcomes of past decisions.
In this paper, we test the adaptation of reference points in response to payoff outcomes
in experimental settings in the domain of security trading.
By “adaptation of the reference point” we mean a shift in the reference point in
the direction of a realized outcome. To illustrate the importance of reference point
adaptation, consider a prospect-theory investor who purchases a stock at $30 per share,
observes it drop to $20, and expects that the stock price will either go up or down by $5
with equal probability. If her reference point remains at the purchase price $30, she will
hold on to the stock because people are risk-seeking in the loss domain. In contrast, if
her reference point has adapted to the new price $20, she will sell the stock at $20 since,
owing to loss-aversion, a zero-expected-value gamble is not attractive. On the upside, if
the stock were to rise from $30 to $40, the extent of upward migration of the reference
point would also affect the propensity to sell the stock. These simple examples illustrate
that reference point adaptation affects risk-taking decisions.
Thaler (1980, 1985) introduced the concept of mental accounting, which has important
implications for prospect theory. Mental accounting consists of the ways in which people
mentally categorize financial transactions in order to monitor where their money is going,
to assess the performance of their investments, and to plan future investment decisions.
We hypothesize that adaptation of the reference point is integrally related to the way
people mentally account for prior gains and losses. If investors fully adapt to the changes
in stock prices by closing out their old mental accounts with all of the realized gains/losses,
they will evaluate future prospects relative to the current stock price. This implies that
prior gains or losses are segregated from the subsequent mental account. However, if
investors do not fully adapt to the price change, a part of the prior gain or loss will be
included in the mental account containing the future prospect.
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Thaler (1999) points out that mental accounting does not have rigid rules like regular
accounting. As a result people may be tempted to be “creative” in adjusting their
accounting principles in order to feel good about themselves or about their pecuniary
outcomes. Such hedonic considerations may influence how investors update the reference
point in response to a price change. We examine two kinds of hedonic considerations.
First, consider again the adaptation of the reference point to a gain versus a loss.
Following a gain, migration of the reference point toward the level of the new wealth
will mean that a subsequent gain will be enjoyed more than if the reference point had
not budged following the first gain. This is due to the fact that the value function is
concave in the region of gains; diminishing returns render subsequent gains less valuable
than initial ones. Thus a hedonic maximizer might adapt to gains in order to re-set the
origin of the prospect theory value function close to the new level of wealth. On the
other hand, the convexity of the value function in the region of losses might cause a value
maximizer to resist reference point migration downward following a loss. If the reference
point adapts to the first loss, a subsequent loss will be more painful than if the original
reference point were to be maintained.
The second factor pertains to the fact that closing an account in the “black” gen-
erates immediate gratification, but closing an account in the “red” produces immediate
misery (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998). Closing an account re-sets the reference point and
segregates the prior consequences from future ones. Due to the differential immediate
hedonic consequences, investors will have more incentive to close a prior account after a
gain than after a loss. This second factor is in addition to the consequence of closing the
account on the hedonic experience of subsequent gains and losses.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly reviews related literature. Section
II presents questionnaire studies designed to test the adaptation of reference points after
gains and after losses. Section III presents tests of reference point adaptation using
studies employing monetary incentives. Section IV discusses the findings, and Section V
concludes.
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I. The Reference Point in Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory as an alternative to the norma-
tive theory of expected utility maximization. Three aspects of prospect theory are most
relevant to our research. First, people derive utility from gains and losses relative to a
reference point, while traditional utility theory assumes that people derive utility from
total wealth or consumption. Second, the value curve is concave in the domain of gains
and convex in the domain of losses. Third, in the neighborhood of the reference point,
the effect on value of a unit of loss is much larger than that of a unit of gain. Thus a
loss has a larger effect than does a gain of equal absolute value. Most research suggests
that losses have an effect approximately 2 to 2.5 times that of a gain (e.g. Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991). In all these aspects of prospect theory, the reference point plays an
important role.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that several factors, such as status quo, social
norms, and aspiration levels may determine the reference point. However, Kahneman
and Tversky did not specify how the reference point changes over time. Since in real-
ity individuals such as investors make multiple decisions over time, it is important to
understand how reference points are updated after investors experience intertemporal
outcomes. This topic has received only a modest amount of prior investigation.
One natural reference point is the price at which the stock was initially purchased.
Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991) provide evidence that the starting point enjoys a
privileged role. The price which began one’s personal history with the stock provides
a natural benchmark for assessing whether the investor’s own action has brought about
a profit or loss. This benchmark effect presumably makes the purchase price a salient
candidate reference point. [Shefrin & Statman (1985) and Odean (1998) provide related
discussion and evidence.] However recent papers such as Koszegi and Rabin (2004) and
Yogo (2005) posit that a person’s reference point is one’s expectations about future
outcomes, not the original purchase price.
The reference point is likely to migrate from the initial purchase price as a stock price
changes over time. Investors may eventually update their reference points to the current
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price or partially update to a price between the initial price and the current price. Chen
and Rao (2002) suggest that people’s reference points shift after a stimulus is presented,
but do so incompletely. However Chen and Rao (2002) only examined situations in which
two outcomes occur with one being positive and the other being negative.
Gneezy (2002) inferred reference point adaptation from participants’ decisions to
sell their stocks when stock prices followed a random walk. He argued that, based
on prospect theory, investors are risk averse in the gain domain and thus should sell
only when the current stock price is above the reference point. His experimental results
suggested that participants are most likely to use the historical peak as the reference
point. However, Gneezy’s design did not allow him to locate the reference point and
compare the magnitude of adaptation between winners and losers, which are the emphases
and main contributions of our paper.
Clearly, more empirical evidence is needed to learn how investors update their refer-
ence points. That is the goal of the present research.
II. Questionnaire Experiments
We used two approaches to test for reference point adaptation. In the first, subjects
answered questions in hypothetical trading scenarios. In the second, we inferred the
reference point adaptation from the trading decisions of subjects in a stock trading game,
in which their monetary payoffs were directly tied to their trading profits. We will first
present the questionnaire studies. In the questionnaires, we asked subjects what stock
price today will generate the same utility for them as a previous change in the stock price.
If the previous stock price is P1 and the previous reference point is R0, the difference
between P1 and R0 should be the same as the difference between the price reported by
subjects (P ∗) and the new reference point R∗, assuming the shape of the prospect value
function remains unchanged.
P ∗ −R∗ = P1 −R0 ⇒ R∗ −R0 = P ∗ − P1 (1)
Through this equality, we can calculate the reference point adaptation.
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The data are obtained from students in an introductory finance course at The Ohio
State University who answered brief questionnaires in a classroom setting. The total
number of respondents for each problem is denoted by N , and the average dollar amount
in their answers and the calculated implied reference point adaptation are indicated in
brackets. We used a between-subject design for the following two basic questions.
1. Basic questions
Problem 1 (winner) [N = 138]: Two months ago, you bought a stock for $30
per share. Last month, you were delighted to learn the stock was trading
higher — at $36 per share. This month, you decide to check the stock’s price
again. At what price would the stock need to trade today to make you just
as happy with the stock’s price this month as you were when you learned the
stock had risen from $30 to $36 last month?
[Average answer: $40.24. Implied adaptation: $4.24]
Problem 2 (loser) [N = 141]: Two months ago, you bought a stock for $30
per share. Last month, you were disappointed to learn the stock was trading
lower — at $24 per share. This month, you decide to check the stock’s price
again. At what price would the stock need to trade today to make you just
as sad with the stock’s price this month as you were when you learned the
stock had dropped from $30 to $24 last month?
[Average answer: $21.49. Implied adaptation: $2.51]
For the winner problem, the subjects on average believed that a gain to $40.24 would
give them the same pleasure as the last month’s price increase to $36: V ($40.24−R1) =
V ($36 − R0). Given that the shape of the prospect value function remains unchanged,
the new perceived gain $40.24 − R1 must be equal to the old perceived gain $36 − R0,
as in equation (1). Hence, the reference point adaptation R1 − R0 should be $4.24
($40.24−R1 = $36−R0 ⇒ R1−R0 = $40.24− $36 = $4.24) after the initial $6 gain. In
contrast, the subjects regarded the loss down to $21.49 to be as painful as last month’s
price decrease to $24. We can infer that the reference point must have adapted downward
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by $2.51 ($21.49− $24). Comparing the adaptation of $4.24 after a gains and $2.51 after
a loss, the difference is $1.73. Hence, adaptation after gains is greater than adaptation
after losses.
2. Intervention with selling and repurchasing
Thaler (1985) discussed the consequences of the integration and segregation of multiple
outcomes. For example, getting two $50 parking tickets might have a different psycho-
logical impact than a single $100 dollar ticket. If one fully adapts after the first ticket,
then a second ticket is painful. Due to the asymptotic nature of the prospect theory’s
value function in the loss region, a single ticket costing $100 would be less agonizing. In
this example it is easy to segregate the two $50 increments by assigning them to different
tickets, and it is easy to integrate them by assigning the two components to the same
ticket.
We attempted the same sort of strategy in our second set of scenarios. In order to
facilitate the segregation of the second gain (or loss) from the first gain (or loss), we wrote
the scenario so that following the first outcome the person sold the stock. The person then
subsequently bought the stock at the same price at which he or she sold it, and a second
gain (or loss) then occurred. Based upon Thaler’s (1985) mental accounting theory,
we expect the selling event to close the mental account of the first transaction and the
repurchasing event to open a new mental account for the new transaction. Accordingly,
compared to the prior basic scenarios, we expect the subjects to be more likely to reset
their new reference point to the new purchase price and away from the initial purchase
price when they sell the stock and later repurchase it at the same price. Using a between-
subjects design, we asked subjects the following two questions.
Problem 3 (winner, with sale and repurchase intervention) [N = 66]: Three
months ago, you bought a stock for $30 per share. Two months ago, you were
delighted to learn the stock was trading higher — at $36 per share. You sold
the stock for $36 per share. Last month, you thought it was still a good idea
to invest in the same stock. So you bought it again at $36 per share. This
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month, you decide to check the stock’s price again. At what price would the
stock need to trade today to make you just as happy with the stock’s price
this month as you were when you learned the stock had risen from $30 to $36
two months ago?
[Average answer: $41.84. Implied adaptation: $5.84]
Problem 4 (loser, with sale and repurchase intervention) [N = 60]: Three
months ago, you bought a stock for $30 per share. Last month, you were
disappointed to learn the stock was trading lower — at $24 per share. You
sold the stock for $24 per share. Last month, you thought it was still a good
idea to invest in the same stock. So you bought it again at $24 per share.
This month, you decide to check the stock’s price again. At what price would
the stock need to trade today to make you just as sad with the stock’s price
this month as you were when you learned the stock had dropped from $30 to
$24 two months ago?
[Average answer: $20.93. Implied adaptation: $3.07]
We again found that adaptation was greater following gains than following losses.
Furthermore we found that the sale/repurchase intervention resulted in an average adap-
tation of $4.52, compared to an average adaptation of only $3.37 without this interven-
tion(See Table 1).
Table 1: Reference Point Adaptation Following Gains and Losses in the Basic Groups,
the Groups with the Sale/Repurchase Intervention, and the Groups with Portfolios
Group Gain Loss Mean
Basic Questions 1 & 2 $4.24 $2.51 $3.37
Sale/Repurchase Intervention Questions 3 & 4 $5.84 $3.07 $4.52
Portfolio Questions 5 & 6 $3.82 $1.55 $2.61
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3. Robustness: The Presence of Portfolios
We also considered whether our results would hold in a few different settings. First,
investors may behave differently when they hold portfolios instead of one single stock.
When holding a portfolio, an investor may evaluate gains and losses of a portfolio rather
than those of each individual stock in her portfolio. If so, it may be the trading outcome
of the portfolio rather than the trading outcome of an individual stock that has an impact
on the reference point. Accordingly, our results may have rather limited implication for
stock markets since most investors usually hold portfolios instead of one stock. Hence,
we examined whether people make different decisions on single stocks when they held
portfolios. We assumed the investor held a portfolio of two stocks, one with a $6 gain as
in Problem 1 and one with a $6 loss as in Problem 2.
Problem 5 (portfolio-gain) [N = 22]: Two months ago, you bought 200 shares
of stock A and 200 shares of stock B, each a price of $30 per share. Last
month, you were delighted to learn stock A was trading higher — at $36 per
share, and you were disappointed to learn stock B was trading lower — at
$24 per share. This month, you decide to check the stock’s price again. At
what price would stock A need to trade today to make you just as happy with
stock A’s price this month as you were when you learned stock A had risen
$6 from $30 to $36 last month?
[Average answer: $39.82. Implied adaptation: $3.82]
Problem 6 (portfolio-loss) [N = 25]: This was the same scenario as in Problem
5, but a different question was asked: At what price would stock B need to
trade today to make you just as sad with stock B’s price this month as you
were when you learned stock B had dropped $6 from $30 to $24 last month?
[Average answer: $22.45. Implied adaptation: $1.55]
The mean adaptation for each of the six scenarios discussed thus far are displayed in
Table 1. We subjected the results of these first six scenarios to a 2 (price movement: win-
ner/loser) × 3 (group: basic questions 1&2/sale & repurchase questions 3&4/portfolio
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questions 5&6) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The winner/loser main effect was signif-
icant [F (1, 446) = 27.42, p < 0.0001], with the adaptation for gains being far greater
than the adaptation for losses ($4.67 versus $2.55). Also significant was the group main
effect [F (2, 446) = 5.74, p < 0.01]. Tukey post tests revealed that the mean adaptation
following the sale and repurchase intervention ($4.52) significantly exceeded the mean
adaptation of the basic questions ($3.37), q(270) = 3.10, p < .05, and it also significantly
exceeded the mean adaptation of the portfolio group, q(270) = 5.15, p < .01. On the
other hand, the portfolio group’s mean adaptation ($2.61) did not differ from that of the
basic questions. The interaction did not approach significance (F < 1).
In short, we find that investors tend to shift reference points upward after prior
gains and downward after prior losses. The size of the adaptation after gains appears to
be greater than that after losses. Inserting a sale and repurchase, which we hypothesize
closed the prior mental account, fostered significantly higher levels of adaptation following
gains and losses.
4. Robustness: Controlling for Expectations
We wanted to minimize the possibility that differences in expectations about future
price movements were responsible for the results we have reported thus far. For example,
subjects may form expectations about future stock prices based on prior price movements.
If they hold a bold momentum view after a prior gain but a cautiously contrarian view
after a prior loss, they may wishfully expect a gain after both prior gains and losses. As
a result, they may report a price level that is further away from the purchase price of $30
after a prior gain than after a prior loss, but the difference in their indicated prices could
be due to expectational biases rather than differences in reference point adaptations. We
tried to minimize the use of expectational biases in the prior experiments by explicitly
stating in the instructions “ . . . that stock prices are not predictable by any means.” To
make the stochastic nature of future prices even more apparent, in the next experiment
we had the participants witness a coin flip which would determine the future price.
We asked the following questions:
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Problems 7 and 8:
At t = 0, you bought one share of stock A for $50 per share. At t = 1, the
experimenter flipped the coin: it is a head (tail). Now your stock is worth
$56 ($44). You have a chance to sell your shares now through a private
transaction to another investor or wait until the second coin flip and sell your
share at P2. So you have two options:
 
Coin Flip 
P2 = $P1 + 4 if head 
    = $P1 – 4 if tail 
  
P0 = $50 P1 = $56 if head 
    = $44 if tail 
Coin Flip 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 
Option A: Sell your share to another investor through a private transaction
for $X.
Option B: Wait until the second period to sell your share at the second period
stock price P2.
The experimenter will flip a coin again, and the stock price will be $60 ($48)
if it is a “head” or $52 ($40) if it is a “tail”. Which stock price $X in Option
A will make you exactly indifferent between the two options? Please indicate
your minimum selling price $X.
Problems 9 and 10: These were identical to Problems 7 and 8 except that we
inserted the sale and repurchase intervention in precisely the same way that
we added them in Problems 3 and 4.
By asking the above questions, we obtained a price that gave the investor the same
utility as the gamble of $60 ($48) and $52 ($40) with equal probability. In this manner we
hoped to achieve greater control over participants’ expectations about subsequent price
movement. We solved their implicit reference point by equating the utility from the gains
of selling stock for $X and the expected utility from the gamble. Thus we inferred their
reference points at date 1 (R1) in the following manner:
V (X −R1) = 0.5V (60−R1) + 0.5V (52−R1) (2)
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where X is the dollar amount they indicate, and R1 is the implicit reference point. The
value function is the cumulative prospect theory value function (Tversky & Kahneman,
1992)
V (x) =
{
xα x > 0
−2.25(−x)α x < 0
After solving equation (2) for the reference point, we obtained the magnitude of adapta-
tion by taking the absolute deviation of the new reference point from the original reference
point (the purchase price). Using α = 0.2, we obtained the mean reference point adap-
tations displayed in Table 2.1 The mean adaptation following a gain was $6.38, and the
mean adaptation following a loss was $5.49. A 2 (Outcome: gain/loss) × 2 (Group: basic
questions/sale-repurchase intervention) ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect
for outcome [F (1, 77) = 14.87, p < .0001].
Table 2: Reference Point Adaptation Following Gains and Losses in the Basic Groups
and the Groups with the Sale/Repurchase Intervention
Outcome
Group Gain Loss
Basic Questions 7 & 8 $6.34 (n = 15) $5.49 (n = 24)
Sale/Repurchase Intervention Questions 9 & 10 $6.40 (n = 26) $5.49 (n = 16)
These results lead us to conclude that the more complete adaptation following gains
is robust to a rather significant change in methodology. However the faster updating fol-
lowing the sale/repurchase intervention, which was manifested using the prior method-
ology, was absent with this new methodology. We will assess the magnitude of the
sale/repurchase intervention once more when we extend our research to experiments in-
volving actual monetary consequences.
In all of the above survey questions, the gains and losses were hypothetical. Some
economists suggest that people may exhibit different behavior when they are provided
with monetary incentives to make better decisions (see the discussion by Camerer & Hog-
arth, 1999). It is possible that the subjects when answering hypothetical questions may
1Our basis for choosing α = 0.2 will be explained below.
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make different decisions compared to when their decisions influence their real payoffs,
and their decisions under monetary incentives may mirror their real life investment deci-
sions more closely. To address this concern, we designed experiments with real monetary
incentives. The details of these experiments are discussed in the next section.
III. Stock Trading Experiments with Monetary Incen-
tives
These experiments have two purposes. The first is to examine whether the asymmetric
adaptation after gains or losses holds when investors’ decisions involve monetary incen-
tives. The second is to explore whether the selling and repurchase events used in questions
3, 4, 9, and 10 influence reference point adaptation when incentives are present.
The basic procedure of the trading experiment mirrors the last question of the previous
section. Each round consists of three dates and two periods. At the beginning of the
trading round, subjects are told that they purchased a stock at a certain price (P0)
and have held the stock for a week. They are then informed of the current price P1,
which is either higher or lower than their purchase price P0. Also, they are informed of
the two future possible prices of the stock in the next trading period (P2). Before the
realization of the second period price P2, subjects have a chance to sell the stock to the
experimenter by stating their minimum selling price. Following the Becker, DeGroot, and
Marschak (1964) procedure (BDM), a buying price is randomly drawn between the two
possible future prices PH2 and P
L
2 . If the randomly drawn buying price exceeds or equals
the subject’s minimum selling price, the subject sells the stock at the randomly drawn
buying price. If the buying price is less than the minimum selling price, the subject holds
the stock and sells it at the next trading period’s price P2 which will be determined by
a coin flip.
Under the BDM procedure, it is optimal for the subjects to set their minimum selling
price equal to their valuation of the gamble. Thus, the BDM procedure reveals through
subjects’ minimum selling prices their valuations of risky gambles, which in turn helps
us infer how their reference point changes after they experience gains or losses.
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 P2 =  P2H if heads 
     =  P2L if tails 
 
P0 P1 
Coin Flip 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 
Submit 
minimum 
selling price 
Method
Procedure. Each subject traded 4 stocks in addition to a set of stocks which were
inserted for the purpose of creating a time delay between the interventions of selling and
repurchasing. Among the 4 stocks, two were winners and two were losers. The winner
stocks, which were purchased at $20, went up to $26 after the first period. The subjects
were informed that the stocks would have to be sold at either $30 or $22 with equal
probability in the next trading period. We then asked them to indicate their minimum
selling price. Our buying price was randomly drawn from the range of the low possible
future price $22 and the high possible future price $30. If the minimum selling price was
below or equal to a randomly drawn price, they would sell the stock for the randomly
drawn price. Otherwise, they would have to hold the stock and sell it in the next trading
period at a price of either $30 or $22 to be determined by a coin flip.
The loser stocks were purchased at $20 and went down to $14 with a future price
of either $18 or $10 with equal probability. The BDM procedure ensures that value-
maximizing investors should indicate a price such that they are indifferent between selling
the stock for that price and taking the gamble in the next period. In other words, by
obtaining the certainty equivalence, we are able to solve for the implied reference point
using prospect value function.
One winner and one loser stock had the intervention of selling and repurchasing that
we used in questions 3 and 4. For those two stocks, we introduced a time delay after the
shares were sold but before they were repurchased. During the time delay, the subjects
traded other stocks in some sessions and solved anagrams in other sessions. This time
delay, which was between 10 and 25 minutes, was designed to help subjects segregate the
prior outcomes.
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In order to maximize the success of the BDM procedure, we explicitly instructed
subjects about the reasoning as to why it is optimal to ask their true valuation of the
stock, including illustrative examples showing how asking above or below one’s valuation
brings suboptimal outcomes. (The instructions are in Appendix A). All subjects in each
session had a chance to gain experience in the trial periods and were paid according to
their trading gains or losses in two randomly selected stocks.2 This creates a pecuniary
incentive for the participants to follow the optimal strategy. By randomly selecting the
stocks whose results would govern the payments, we ensured that that the subjects would
pay equal attention to all of the four stocks we are interested in. This procedure also
minimized the influence of the gains and losses from other stocks.
The subjects were promised a $20 base payment for participation. In addition, they
were told that their trading profit or loss would be added to the $20 participation fee to
yield their final payment. They were also told that, at the end of the experiment, one
of the stocks they have traded will be randomly drawn and its trading profit will count
toward their final payoff. Further, since trading profits are not cumulative, their decisions
should not be influenced by prior outcomes. The maximum gains or losses were $10. The
trading profits were divided by two before joining the $20 participation payment, which
made the range of the final payoff from $15 to $25.
In the first few sessions of the experiment, we conducted a brief survey after the games
and asked subjects to rate their understanding of the procedure (1: very poor, 2: poor,
3: fair, 4: good, 5: very good, 6: excellent) and whether or not they were convinced
about the optimal strategy in stating their minimum prices with BDM mechanism (1:
definitely “no,” 2: probably “no,” 3: unsure, 4: probably “yes,” 5: definitely “yes”).
Participants. A total of 100 undergraduate students from introductory finance courses
at the Ohio State University and DePaul University participated in the experiment.
Results
We found no significant differences in the reference point adaptation between the
two groups of subjects who had different activities (anagrams versus other stock trading
2Among the two stocks that counted toward subjects’ final payoff, one was randomly selected from
the 4 stocks we studied and the other one was from the other stocks.
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exercises) during the time delay. Therefore we collapsed over this factor.
We used a survey in the end of the first few sessions to check subjects’ understanding
of the experiments. A total of 46 subjects answered the survey. Subjects gave an average
5.3/6 rating to their understanding of the experimental procedure, and an average rating
of 3.8/5 to their acceptance of the optimal strategy under the BDM mechanism. More
than 71% of subjects said that they indeed reported their true minimum selling price.
For those who claimed that they did not respond in such a manner as to reveal the true
indifference price, they generally claimed that they systematically asked either higher
prices or lower prices than their true minimum selling price. However, there was no
clear pattern of biased reporting toward either higher or lower prices relative to the true
minimum selling price.
After obtaining the reported minimum selling price (Pmin), we inferred their reference
points at date 1 (R1) in the following manner:
V (Pmin −R1) = 0.5V (PH2 −R1) + 0.5V (PL2 −R1) (3)
Though we explicitly instructed the subjects that a reasonable minimum selling price
should be between the two possible future prices P 2H and P
2
L, a few subjects still reported
a minimum selling price as either P 2H or P
2
L. We interpret these behaviors as inconsistent
with that described in prospect theory.3 For these observations there is no solution for
the implied reference point for some minimum selling price, regardless of the value of α
we pick. In addition, a few subjects reported a price that was 10 or 20 cents below P 2H .
or above P 2L. For these observations, we generally find a solution for the implied reference
point when we choose α relatively small α, such as 0.2. But we obtain no solution when α
is large, close to the proposed value of 0.88 suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
To increase the range of minimum selling price that makes equation (3) solvable, we
used α = 0.2. We defined the amount of reference point adaptation as |R1 − P0|. As a
3In the prospect theory value function, utility increases in perceived gains (or decreases in perceived
losses). Thus, the expected utility of the gamble cannot be equal to the utility of one possible outcome.
Choosing to report a minimum selling price as P 2H suggests that the subject is extremely risk-seeking
and she prefers to take the gamble in any circumstances. In contrast, choosing to report a minimum
selling price as P 2L suggests that the subject is extremely risk-averse and she will take everything to
avoid the gamble.
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robustness check, we used a higher value of α (e.g. α = 0.5) and the results appear to be
even stronger though we had to throw away a few observations for which we could not
find the solutions.4 The following analyses are based solely on α = 0.2. We discarded
9 observations from the loser-sell/repurchase intervention cell due to a procedural error.
Five data points were not calculable due to the reasons mentioned above. Thus the 100
participants contributed 386 data points in this completely within-subject design.
Table 3 reports the average reference point adaptation for the 4 stocks. Our results
show that reference points adapt faster to the past gains than losses by $0.59. Also,
the selling and repurchasing event increases the size of reference point adaptation in a
significant way. After such an intervention is inserted, the reference point adapts faster
by $0.39.
Table 3: Reference Point Adaptation Using Financial Incentives Following Gains and
Losses in the Basic Groups and the Groups with the Sale/Repurchase Intervention
Outcome
Group Gain Loss Mean
Basic Questions $5.75 $5.13 $5.44
Sale/Repurchase Intervention Questions $6.10 $5.55 $5.83
Mean $5.93 $5.34
Using a 2(outcome: winner/loser)× 2(selling-repurchase intervention: present/absent)
ANOVA, we find that the winner/loser effect is significant [F (1,86) = 6.81, p = 0.01]
and the intervention effect is also significant [F (1,86) = 15.22, p < 0.01]. The interaction
effect did not approach significance.
Discussion
The results of this experiment replicated the results presented in Table 1, which
contains data obtained from participants who did not have financial incentives. Namely,
4We lose 5 observations for winner questions and 10 observations for the loser questions after we
switch from α = 0.2 to α = 0.5. The deleted observations with higher value of α do not seem to bias
the results in support of the asymmetric adaptation. In fact, we lose more observations from the low
adaptation for losers which should increase the overall mean adaptation of the losers, thus mitigating
the asymmetry.
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adaptation was more complete following gains than losses, and the selling/repurchase
intervention accelerated adaptation.
While we have documented reference point adaptation in dollar terms, the conclusion
is identical if we interpret them in percentage returns. Without the selling/repurchase
intervention, the reference point increases by 28.75% ($5.75/$20 = 0.2895) after a 30%
increase ($6/$20 = 0.3) in stock price. Following a 30% decrease in stock price, the
reference point decreases by 25.65% ($5.13/$20). Since both the winner and loser stock
cases start with the same purchase price of $20, the amount of reference point adaptation
in percentage returns is the dollar amount divided by $20. We have chosen to report all
results in dollars rather than in percentage returns.
IV. General Discussion
Using questionnaire and money-incentive experiments, we found that people tend to
adapt reference points upward after stock investment gains and downward after losses,
and that the size of the adaptation after gains tends to be greater than that after losses.
Such asymmetry in adaptation is observed in experiments with and without monetary
incentives. It is robust to whether investors hold a single stock or a portfolio, to whether
investors sold the stock after the price change or kept holding the stock.
We hypothesize that the faster adaptation to gains than to losses is related to mental
accounting and hedonic maximization. In particular, the asymmetric adaptation can
be at least partially explained by the tendency to integrate intertemporal gains and
segregate intertemporal losses. Specifically, after experiencing gains, segregating part of
the prior gains from the subsequent mental account increases hedonic utility by placing
the remaining prior gains in the steeper region of the gain domain and also using it
to cushion the future possible losses. In contrast, after experiencing losses, investors
are inclined to keep it integrated so that it is evaluated in the flatter region in the loss
domain in order to minimize hedonic disutility. We can illustrate the intuition through
two simple examples. Our examples mirror the stocks in our experiment with monetary
incentives.
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Suppose investors purchased a stock at $20, and later the stock price rose to $26. In
the next period, they have to sell the stock at either $4 higher or lower from the current
price $26. That is, the future selling price is either $30 or $22 with equal probability.
We assume that there are two mental accounts: in the old mental account, the reference
point is $20; in the new mental account, the reference point is $R1. Updating a reference
point is equivalent to closing the old mental account at the new reference point, which
produces the value of V (R1 − P0). Then the total value from trading the stock is the
sum of the values from both the old and new mental accounts:
V = V (R1 − 20) + 0.5V (30−R1) + 0.5V (22−R1). (4)
To show that adaptation is preferred to non-adaptation, let us compare two cases:
in Case 1, the reference point adapts to $22; in Case 2, it remains at $20. When the
reference point adapts to $22, the overall value is
V1 = V (22− 20) + 0.5V (30− 22) + 0.5V (22− 22) = V (2) + 0.5V (8). (5)
However, when the reference point remains at $20, the overall value is
V2 = V (20− 20) + 0.5V (30− 20) + 0.5V (22− 20) = 0.5V (10) + 0.5V (2). (6)
It is easy to show that V1 > V2 since
V1 − V2 = 0.5V (2) + 0.5V (8)− 0.5V (10) > 0. (7)
because in the gain domain of the prospect theory value function, segregating gains
generates higher utility. Thus, the value from the segregated two gains is greater than
the value from a single lump-sum gain. Accordingly, after gains, adapting the reference
point is preferred to no adaptation.
In contrast, suppose investors purchased a stock at $20, and later the stock price
dropped to $14. In the next period, they have to sell the stock at either $18 or $10 with
equal probability. Then the total value from trading the stock is still
V = V (R1 − 20) + 0.5V (18−R1) + 0.5V (10−R1). (8)
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When we compare adaptation (Case 1) versus no adaptation (Case 2) in this case, it
is easy to show that V1 < V2 since
V1 − V2 = 0.5V (−2) + 0.5V (−8)− 0.5V (−10) < 0. (9)
In the loss domain, it is optimal to integrate losses, because integrating losses generates
higher value than segregating them by updating the reference point.
To further illustrate that it is optimal for investors to adapt to gains rather than
to losses when facing uncertainty, we calculated the prospect theory value for a range
of possible reference points for the above two numerical examples. Consistent with our
argument above, we will show that the maximum utility is achieved when reference
points adapt upward after prior gains and when reference points stay unchanged after
prior losses.
Figure 1: Total value of a gain from $20 to $26 plus a subsequent sale of the stock at
either $30 or $22 with equal probability as a function of the new reference point.
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Recall that the winner stock was purchased at $20, rose to $26, and would have to
be sold at $30 or $22 with equal probability. In the prospect theory value function, we
set λ = 2.25 and α = 0.88, where λ is the ratio of the impact of the loss to that of a
gain. Under these parameter values, we calculate the prospect theory value based on the
following equation for a range of R1.
V = V (R1 − 20) + 0.5V (30−R1) + 0.5V (22−R1). (10)
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As can be seen in Figure 1, the maximum total value would be achieved by setting
the new reference point equal to $22, the lowest possible future price. In other words, it
would be optimal to adapt the reference point upward by $2 after gains. Thus, the prior
gain of $6 ($26− $20) would be segregated into two parts: $2 ($22− $20) goes to the old
mental account and the remaining $4 goes to the new mental account.
The loser stock was purchased at $20, dropped to $14, and would have to be sold at
either $18 or $10 with equal probability. Using the same parameter values of the prospect
theory value function, we calculate the value based on the following equation for a range
of R1.
V = V (R1 − 20) + 0.5V (18−R1) + 0.5V (10−R1). (11)
Figure 2: Total value of a loss from $20 to $14 plus a subsequent sale of the stock at
either $18 or $10 with equal probability as a function of the new reference point.
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In Figure 2, we show that in this case, the maximum total value is achieved by
setting the new reference point equal to $20. In other words, it is optimal not to adapt
the reference point after a loss. Thus, to achieve maximal value the prior loss of $6 would
be fully integrated into to the new mental account.
If the hedonic consideration were the only factor underlying reference point adapta-
tion, these examples suggest that one would never adapt to losses and the adaptation to
gains would be small enough to maximize the likelihood that future prospects are in the
gain domain. However, a sense of reality may force investors to take into account the
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current price to some extent. Therefore we concede that the tug of reality may increase
the amount of reference point adaptation beyond that predicted in the prior two exam-
ples Therefore, we expect that there will be some adaptation in reality to both gains and
losses, but with an asymmetry of gains and losses due to hedonic maximization.
Our suggestion that a greater proportion of prior gains than losses is likely to be
segregated from the new mental account is consistent with the hedonic editing hypothesis
proposed by Thaler (1985) which maintains that people mentally account for outcomes
to make themselves as happy as possible. Another main contribution of our paper is that
we have proposed a methodology to locate a reference point, which has enabled us to
explicitly test the asymmetry in adaptation after gains and losses.
Relation to Prior Research
There are a few papers that have examined reference point adaptation through dif-
ferent approaches. Our model and results are also consistent with these studies.
Gneezy (2002) finds that subjects’ selling behaviors in a stock trading experiment are
best explained when the past price peak is assumed as the reference point. The reason
why the past price peak becomes the reference point can be understood by asymmetric
adaptation. Since investors tend to move reference points upward after gains more than
downward after losses, after experiencing gains or losses, reference points tend to be
closer to the higher of the two prices — the past period price and the current period
price. When a reference point moves more quickly upward to a higher price compared
to downward toward a lower price, after a number of periods it will eventually approach
the past price peak.
Thaler and Johnson (1990) examine the change in people’s risk seeking tendency
after prior outcomes. They find that subjects become more risk seeking after prior gains,
which they coin the “house money effect.” They propose the quasi-hedonic editing rule
to explain the house money effect. Under the quasi-hedonic editing rule, when facing a
gamble after a prior gain, people segregate the future possible gain from the prior gain
while they integrate the future possible loss with the prior gain. Due to segregation
of gains and integration of losses, the gamble becomes more attractive. It is worth
noting that under the quasi-hedonic editing rule, one uses two different reference points
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to evaluate a gamble: the current wealth is the reference point to evaluate the gain
prospect of the gamble; the initial wealth is the reference point to evaluate the loss
prospect.
Our framework with partial reference point adaptation can also shed light on the
house money effect. Furthermore, our framework involves just one reference point to
evaluate both the gain prospect and the loss prospect of the gamble. When one partially
adapts to prior gains, the prior gain is segregated into two parts: one part goes to the old
mental account; the other part goes to the current mental account. The remaining gain
in the current mental account can serve as a cushion for the future possible loss, which
reduces the incremental disutility of the loss prospect. Therefore, the gamble becomes
more attractive conditional on a prior gain. Thus, partial reference point adaptation
can serve as an alternative to the quasi-hedonic editing rule to explain the house money
effect.
In addition, Thaler and Johnson (1990) also find that, conditioning on a prior gain,
between a risky gamble and a sure outcome (which they call the “two-stage game”),
subjects tend to prefer the gamble to the sure outcome. In contrast, when subjects were
presented another scenario in which, instead of having a prior gain, the prior gain in the
“two-stage game” is integrated with the future prospects of the gamble (which is called
the “one-stage game”), subjects switched to prefer the sure outcome. In other words,
subjects became more risk seeking when moving from the one-stage game to the two-
stage game with a prior gain. In contrast, they are less risk seeking when moving from
the one-stage game to the two-stage game with a prior loss. Based on these findings,
Thaler and Johnson (1990) conclude that whether the question is framed as a static
choice problem or a dynamic choice problem can change the way subjects code outcome
payoffs and therefore their risk preferences.
We argue that partial reference point adaptation can also explain the above findings.
In a one-stage game, there is no prior outcome and thus reference points do not update.
However, in a two-stage game, the presence of prior outcomes forces reference points to
adapt toward the outcome payoffs. In the case with a prior gain, reference points move
upward, which segregates the prior gains intertemporally and increases the attractiveness
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of the gamble. In contrast, when there is a prior loss, reference points move downward,
which segregates the prior losses intertemporally and decreases the attractiveness of the
gamble. Taken together, due to adaptation toward prior outcomes, people exhibit in-
creased risk preferences in the two-stage gamble with a prior gain but decreased risk
preferences in the two-stage gamble with a prior loss.
Finally, the differential rates of adaptation between gains and losses would also have
important implications on the inability to “make peace with one’s losses,” which is typ-
ically necessary if one is going to avoid succumbing to the sunk cost effect (Arkes &
Blumer, 1985). We have shown that to maximize hedonic utility, people are unable to
ignore sunk costs; they are unable to segregate prior losses from the consideration of
future prospects. This will result in keeping the prior account open, integrating the cur-
rent account with the prior one, and remaining in the southwest quadrant of the prospect
theory value function where future losses are assuaged by the asymptote of the curve.
These factors will contribute to the maladaptive economic behavior known either as the
sunk cost effect or escalation of commitment (Staw & Ross, 1987).
In the gain region of the prospect theory value function we propose that updating
and segregation of accounts is more likely to occur. This would explain the ”hedonic
treadmill” proposed by Brinkman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978). People seem not to
be satisfied with improvements, which are quickly deemed insufficient. Quick adaptation
of an individual’s reference point in the direction of the initial improvement renders that
improvement inadequate, motivating new efforts. Thus the individual views his current
wealth position as being at the new reference point, where the marginal utility from a
further gain and the marginal disutility of an incremental loss are at their greatest (see
also Scitovsky, 1976.)
Implications for Investment Behavior
In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in the study of individual investor
trading behavior. Among the various patterns that have been identified concerning in-
dividual investor behavior is the disposition effect (Shefrin & Statman, 1985), which has
been extensively documented (e.g. Odean, 1998; Weber & Camerer, 1998; Genesove &
Mayer 2001; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Dhar & Zhu, in press). The disposition effect
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is defined as the tendency to hold losers too long and to sell winners too soon. Note
that our hypothesis concerning reference point adaptation would lead one to predict that
there are positive hedonic consequences of closing mental accounts in the gain region
and negative hedonic consequences of closing mental accounts in the loss region, which
is entirely consistent with the disposition effect.
Weber and Camerer (1998) investigate the disposition effect in an experimental set-
ting. They identify the disposition effect by assuming the purchase price or the most
recent price as the reference points. Weber and Camerer conjecture that subjects may
even rely upon multiple reference points in making selling decisions. We argue that the
reference point in the current mental account is related to both the purchase price and
any subsequent price that investors have experienced to the extent of how much the
reference point has updated toward any of those prior outcomes. Depending on which
past prices have had a stronger effect on the current reference point with which investors
make their liquidation decision, one may find a stronger disposition effect by assuming
one reference point rather than another.
In a recent paper, Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2005) developed a model where
investors select whether to pay attention to their current portfolio value. The authors
assumed that paying attention increases the speed of reference point adaptation, and
they test the predictions of their model that investors are more likely to pay attention
to their portfolios when the market is up than down. Their results indicate that the
reference point adapts faster in rising markets than in falling ones, consistent with our
findings. However, our results suggest that reference points adapt faster to gains than
losses irrespective of whether the aggregate market rises or falls, implying that differences
in attention in up or down markets are not the sole cause of asymmetric reference point
adaptation.
Several theoretical models of asset pricing (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001; Barberis
& Huang 2001; Grinblatt & Han, 2005) take into account of the adaptation of reference
points. In these models, reference points migrate symmetrically toward new outcomes. If
individual investors adapt their reference point asymmetrically to gains and losses as we
hypothesize, this would have far-reaching consequences for these theories of asset pricing.
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V. Conclusion
In prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the reference point plays a prominent
role. Whenever one outcome follows another, the hedonic consequences of the second one
depend in part on the adaptation of one’s reference point to the first one. Heretofore there
has not been a systematic investigation of the magnitude of adaptation of the reference
point to a gain or loss. The purpose of our research has been to address this issue.
Our results lead us to conclude that reference point adaptation occurs more completely
to gains than to losses. This result was obtained under a variety of circumstances, in-
cluding questionnaire studies, investigations using financial incentives, and scenarios that
included portfolios as well as individual stocks. In addition, we obtained evidence that
adaptation occurs more quickly if a stock is sold and then repurchased at the prior sell-
ing price. We hypothesize that the more complete adaptation under these circumstances
is due to the fact that the sale closes the prior “mental account” (Thaler, 1999), thus
segregating it from the subsequent one. With a new mental account thus initiated, the
purchaser can more fully adapt to the prior one. Without the sale, the prior mental ac-
count is not closed, and a new gain or loss is integrated with the prior one, thus stalling
a person’s adaptation to the prior one.
We attempted to relate the asymmetric adaptation of gains and losses to several
aspects of investor behavior, including the house money effect (Thaler & Johnson 1990),
the disposition effect (Shefrin, 2000), the sunk cost effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), and
the “hedonic treadmill” (Brickman, et al., 1978). We have suggested that our results may
also inform theories of asset pricing, including those pertaining to the equity premium
puzzle. We are not, of course, the first to suggest that one adapts quickly to gains.
According to George Bernard Shaw, “There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose
your heart’s desire. The other is to gain it.” Although he did not express his view in
the following terms, apparently Shaw felt that the gain of one’s heart’s desire shifts one’s
reference point sharply upward, making the attainment of the prize eventually seem much
less glorious than anticipated.
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Appendix A: Instructions to Participants: Optimal
Strategy in Stating the Minimum Selling Price
Before the second period, you have a chance to sell your stock by stating your minimum
selling price. A buying price will then be randomly drawn from a known range of stock
prices (ranging from the lowest to the highest second period price). If the randomly
drawn price exceeds or equals your minimum selling price, you will sell the stock at the
randomly drawn price. If the randomly drawn price is less than your minimum selling
price, you will hold the stock until the second period, and you will sell your stock at the
second period stock price determined by a coin flip.
You form your minimum selling price based on possible future stock prices. Your
minimum selling price is equal to the number of dollars that someone would have to pay
you to make you just barely willing to sell the stock, instead of holding it until the second
period. Therefore, your minimum selling price is equal to what the stock is worth to you:
You prefer holding the stock if someone offers you a price lower than your minimum
selling price, and you prefer selling the stock if someone offers you a price higher than
your minimum selling price.
Your best strategy in submitting your minimum selling price is truthfully reporting
what the stock is worth to you: it is not your advantage to submit your minimum selling
price higher or lower than what the stock is worth to you.
To see why, suppose you are willing to sell the stock at or above $55 because you
think the stock is worth $55 to you. If you submitted $53 for your minimum selling price
and the randomly drawn buying price was $54, you would be forced to sell your stock at
$54, resulting in a one-dollar loss for you ($55− $54 = $1). That is, you would be forced
to sell the stock for $54 even though it is worth $55 to you. Thus, you don’t want to ask
only $53. In fact, if you ask a minimum selling price lower than $55, there is always a
possibility that the randomly drawn buying price is below $55, forcing you to sell your
stock at a price lower than your valuation of the stock. So you never want to submit the
minimum selling price lower than your true stock valuation.
Now suppose you set your minimum selling price higher than $55, say, $57. If the
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randomly drawn buying price was $56, you will lose a chance to sell the stock at $56,
because the price you asked ($57) is higher than the price being offered ($56). Had you
asked a price of $55 instead of $57, you would have sold your stock for $56 and have made
a $1 profit ($56− $55 = $1). In fact, if you ask a minimum selling price higher than $55,
there is always a possibility that the randomly drawn buying price is between your stock
valuation ($55) and what you submit as your minimum selling price, thus preventing a
sale. By asking above $55, you throw away possible profits in this situation.
Therefore, you don’t want to submit a higher price than your true minimum selling
price. These arguments confirm that the optimal strategy is always to set your minimum
selling price equal to what the stock is worth to you. The purpose of our game is to
study the stock valuations of different people. Your task in the game is to decide what
the stock is worth to you, taking into account what you are told about the future possible
prices of the stock.
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